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Abstract
We discuss the idea of a purely algorithmic universal world iCurrency set
forth in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014] and expanded in [Kakushadze and Liew,
2017] in light of recent developments, including Libra. Is Libra a contender
to become iCurrency? Among other things, we analyze the Libra proposal,
including the stability and volatility aspects, and discuss various issues that
must be addressed. For instance, one cannot expect a cryptocurrency such
as Libra to trade in a narrow band without a robust monetary policy. The
presentation in the main text of the paper is intentionally nontechnical. It
is followed by an extensive appendix with a mathematical description of the
dynamics of (crypto)currency exchange rates in target zones, mechanisms for
keeping the exchange rate from breaching the band, the role of volatility, etc.
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The idea of a universal world currency is not new.4 With the advent of Bitcoin
[Nakamoto, 2008] and other cryptocurrencies,5 this idea has acquired a brand new
angle. Thus, in December 2014 the paper [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014]6 was posted
on SSRN,7 and this paper proposes a purely algorithmic universal world iCurrency.8
The paper [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014] set forth the following criteria for iCur-
rency: 1) it is not a currency issued (or backed) by any government; 2) it is valued
based solely on supply and demand; 3) it is easily transferred across regions and
globally accepted as a payment method; and 4) it is algorithmic, with no human
intervention. At that time, this might have seemed (and probably did) like a far-
fetched utopian idea. E.g., based on the wild historical volatility of Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies, criterion 2) above may appear to be most challenging in
terms of stability of iCurrency, which would be important for universal adoption.
Subsequently, the paper [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017]9 expanded on the ideas
of [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014] with two important new insights. First, iCurrency
could be issued by a broad consortium of governments, thereby preserving criterion
1) above.10 The idea here is very simple. To avoid any given government or a
group of governments going rogue and manipulating iCurrency,11 all is required is
that a network collusion (of the majority or super-majority of the network members,
depending on the precise protocol) is virtually impossible. This does not require an
enormous number of miners – unlike decentralized Bitcoin, with a consortium, there
4 For some literature on this and related topics, see, e.g., [Bordo and James, 2006], [Cooper,
1984], [Cooper, 2006], [Friedman, 1951], [Graham, 1944], [Graham, 1941], [Hart, 1976], [Hayek,
1943], [Iwamoto, 1997], [Kaldor, 1964], [Keynes, 1943], [Mundell, 2005], [Rogoff, 2001], [Schmukler,
2006], [Starr, 2006], [Steil, 2007], [Ussher, 2009], [Welfens, 2006], and references therein.
5 Also see, e.g., [Berentsen and Schär, 2018], [Buterin et al, 2014], [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017]
(for a host of references), [Schwartz, Youngs and Britto, 2014], [White, 2015].
6 This paper was uploaded to SSRN on Dec 24, 2014 and officially processed by SSRN on Dec
26, 2014. The full PDF of this paper was freely downloadable from SSRN until the paper was
published in The Journal of Portfolio Management (JPM) in Spring 2015 as an Invited Editorial.
Its full PDF was freely downloadable from JPM’s website until circa early 2018, when JPM’s
website was migrated, and with 12,000+ downloads this paper was JPM’s most downloaded article
of all time. So, apparently, the paper had a wide distribution and its contents were widely known.
7 Social Science Research Network (https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/).
8 It is unknown what “i” stands for in iCurrency. It has nothing to do with iPhone though.
9 This paper was uploaded to SSRN on Oct 25, 2017 and officially processed by SSRN on
Oct 26, 2017, with subsequent minor revisions focused on anti-money laundering (AML), sus-
tainability (electricity consumption due to mining) and effects on bank fees of government-issued
cryptocurrencies (to appeal to the readership base of Risk, where a shortened version of this paper
was published under the title “Russian crypto-currency will threaten AML efforts”), but with the
iCurrency section unaltered. Importantly, the full PDF of the paper has been freely download-
able from SSRN since Oct 25, 2017, including the consortium and target zone ideas (see below).
Furthermore, the paper was discussed by the press [Bershidsky, 2017], [Holmes, 2017], with other
outlets reprinting these articles.
10 As well as aiding in satisfying criterion 3) above.
11 E.g., via (analogs of) central banks artificially increasing or decreasing interest rates, monetary
supply manipulation, political influences, and so forth.
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is no need for mining, and about 100 or so consortium members would suffice.12
Second, [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017] further proposes that, to achieve stability
and low volatility in the context of criterion 2) above, a staged rollout of iCurrency
may be warranted, whereby its value is determined by a combination of supply and
demand and some regulation by a central authority, e.g., via a target zone similar
to USD/HKD, which trades between 7.75 and 7.85, a band fixed by the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority (HKMA). So, iCurrency too could be regulated at first to stay
in such a target zone, which could be gradually relaxed and perhaps removed entirely
at some future time.13 Or perhaps some wide target zone could still be maintained.14
To be clear, even in the HKD/USD-style target zone iCurrency would still be
valued based solely on supply and demand as the regulation by a central authority
itself is based on supply and demand. E.g., in the case of USD/HKD, HKD is fully
backed by USD reserves, and HKMA, which is a currency board, intervenes when
HKD is weak (i.e., hits the upper boundary of 7.85 of the target zone) or strong
(i.e., hits the lower boundary of 7.75 of the target zone) by buying HKD in exchange
for USD (thereby reducing the HKD supply) or selling HKD in exchange for USD
(thereby increasing the HKD supply), respectively. So, because HKMA does not
create HKD out of thin air and HKD is fully backed by USD reserves, USD/HKD
is 100% based on supply and demand (just as in criterion 2) above for iCurrency),
except that some of that supply and demand is unregulated (that stemming from
free market participants) and some of it is regulated (that stemming from HKMA).15
Another important aspect of Hong Kong’s Linked Exchange Rate System (LERS)
[HKMA, 2011] is that Hong Kong interbank interest rates closely follow their U.S.
counterparts; the Hong Kong short-term interest rates are essentially “pegged” to
the U.S. short-term interest rates, with the spread between them reflecting the
premium/discount stemming from the USD/HKD exchange rate. Thus, under Un-
covered Interest Rate Parity (UIRP),16 if HKD is weak (i.e., USD trades above the
12 So long as the protocol is 100% democratic, unlike, e.g., the UN Security Council protocol.
13 “Stability” and “volatility” are meaningful only if there is another numeraire to compare a
currency with. If iCurrency were the only currency in the entire world, then it would appear to
have no choice but to be stable. What could be unstable is prices of goods and services in some
parts of the world (inflation). However, this would not make iCurrency unstable per se. Indeed,
hyperinflation in, e.g., Zimbabwe or Venezuela does not destabilize USD, EUR or JPY.
14 In which case iCurrency would not be 100% based on unregulated supply and demand (see
below), but could be close to it for all practical purposes, and the band would ensure some nominal
degree of stability in case of unforeseen impactful events.
15 The HK$10 notes and coins are issued by the Hong Kong Government. Other notes are issued
by three note issuing banks, to wit, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited,
the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited, and the Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited.
See, e.g., https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/monetary-stability/notes-coins-
hong-kong/notes.shtml.
16 For some literature on UIRP and related topics, see, e.g., [Anker, 1999], [Ayuso and Restoy,
1996], [Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006], [Baillie and Osterberg, 2000], [Bekaert, Wei and Xing,
2007], [Beyaert, García-Solanes, and Pérez-Castejón, 2007], [Bilson, 1981], [Chaboud and Wright,
2005], [Engel, 1996], [Fama, 1984], [Frachot, 1996], [Froot and Thaler, 1990], [Hansen and Hodrick,
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midpoint 7.80 of the target zone, closer to 7.85), then the Hong Kong interest rates
should be lower than their U.S. counterparts. Similarly, if HKD is strong (i.e., USD
trades below the midpoint 7.80 of the target zone, closer to 7.75), then the Hong
Kong interest rates should be higher than their U.S. counterparts. Otherwise there
will be arbitrage opportunities through carry trades (see Appendix A for details).17
In fact, HKMA’s role in ensuring that USD/HKD does not breach the band can-
not be underestimated. Thus, according to its 2018 report [HKMA, 2019], HKMA
intervened 27 times and bought HK$103.5 billion “from the market in an orderly
and transparent manner” to counteract the weakening of HKD against USD at the
upper (7.85) boundary. According to [HKMA, 2019], this weakening was caused by
rising U.S. interest rates, which “attracted increased interest carry trade activities
involving the selling of HKD in exchange for USD”. The bottom line is that, without
HKMA’s aforesaid serial interventions, USD/HKD would invariably breach the up-
per boundary of the band in 2018. Furthermore, note that the HKMA’s monetary
policy intervention process “is very much an automatic mechanism” [HKMA, 2011].
Hong Kong’s LERS has been in place for over 35 years and has withstood the
test of time. In this regard, the proposal of [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017] to use an
USD/HKD-style target zone to achieve iCurrency stability appears to make sense.
In fact, a recent development – the proposed Libra cryptocurrency [The Libra As-
sociation, 2019] – has put yet another twist on the idea of iCurrency. Libra, if
materialized,18 a priori could be a contender for iCurrency. In fact, two of the main
ideas behind Libra are precisely those set forth in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017],
to wit, i) Libra is governed by the independent Libra Association [The Libra Asso-
ciation, 2019], which is the consortium proposed in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017],
and ii) Libra is operated similarly to “currency boards (e.g., of Hong Kong)” and
coins can be converted “back to fiat at a narrow spread above or below their cur-
rent value” [Catalini et al, 2019], which is the USD/HKD-style target zone proposed
in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017].19 So, could Libra possibly become iCurrency?
1980], [Harvey, 2015], [Hodrick, 1987], [Ilut, 2012], [Lewis, 1995], [Lustig and Verdelhan, 2007],
[Mark and Wu, 2001], [Roll and Yan, 2008].
17 However, as we discuss in Appendix A, pegging interest rates “perfectly”, that is, to eliminate
such arbitrage opportunities, may not always be possible in high FX rate volatility environments.
Also, note that deviations from UIRP are not risk-free arbitrage opportunities (see below).
18 There are many hurdles for Libra, including regulatory ones (see, e.g., [Kihara, 2019], [Marsh,
2019], [USHCFS, 2019]). However, there are also other, more basic issues that must be addressed
(see below). For critiques of the Libra proposal from other angles, see, e.g., [Fatas, 2019], [White,
2019]. Also, for the technical details of the Libra blockchain, see [Amsden et al, 2019].
19 Recently a perplexing article [Allison, 2019] was published with the title “MIT Fellow Says
Facebook ‘Lifted’ His Ideas for Libra Cryptocurrency”, the claim apparently being that those ideas
were “lifted” from [Lipton, Hardjono and Pentland, 2018]. Both [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014] and
[Kakushadze and Liew, 2017] substantially predate [Lipton, Hardjono and Pentland, 2018], so the
claim that Facebook “lifted” the ideas for Libra from [Lipton, Hardjono and Pentland, 2018] has no
leg to stand on. If any papers deserve credit, those would appear to be [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014]
and [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017]. To be clear, we have no quarrel with Libra: strictly speaking,
commercially-oriented white papers (which are not academic papers or patent applications) are
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There are some issues with the Libra proposal in its current form (see [The
Libra Association, 2019], [Catalini et al, 2019]). First, Libra will be backed by “a
collection of low-volatility assets, including bank deposits and government securities
in currencies from stable and reputable central banks” (i.e., high credit rating assets
to ensure capital preservation), and these will be short-maturity assets to guarantee
liquidity [Catalini et al, 2019]. So, for all intents and purposes, “the value of Libra
will be effectively linked to a basket of fiat currencies” [Catalini et al, 2019]. At first,
it might appear that, backing Libra by a reserve (effectively) holding a diverse basket
of fiat currencies (as opposed to one currency as in the case of HKD) would help
make it more stable and less volatile. However, as mentioned above, “stability” and
“volatility” are meaningful only if there is another numeraire to compare a currency
with (see fn. 13). I.e., the question is w.r.t. what numeraire would Libra be “more
stable”/“less volatile” if it is (effectively) backed by a basket of fiat currencies? Is
this numeraire USD, gold, a basket of commodities, or...? I.e., what is the yardstick?
The issue here is that currently there is no supranational/universal numeraire
that iCurrency is meant to be. So, if Libra’s stability is measured by using USD as
the numeraire, then there is a hiccup here. Uniform weighting is not critical here, so
for the sake of simplicity let us assume that the underlying fiat basket is uniformly
weighted (i.e., all N fiat currencies in the reserve basket initially have the same USD
amounts).20 If N is sizable (e.g., N ≥ 10), then the USD contribution is relatively
small and the basket is dominated by the (N − 1) foreign currencies. However, this
is simply a bet against the state of the U.S. economy. Indeed, the essence of the
so-called dollar carry trade (see, e.g., [Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan, 2014]) is
to be long (short) USD and short (long) a diversified basket of foreign currencies
(typically, with equal weights) when the average cross-sectional forward discount21
for the foreign currency basket is negative (positive). Empirical evidence suggests
that this strategy relates to the state of the U.S. economy: when the U.S. economy is
weak (strong), the average forward discount tends to be positive (negative).22 A bet
against the U.S. economy hardly would make much sense as a reserve backing Libra.
One way to mitigate this is to have nonuniform weights with a large weight allocated
to USD (with EUR and JPY also having larger weights than other currencies in the
not required to cite others, albeit, unsurprisingly, it would certainly be pleasant if the Libra white
papers [The Libra Association, 2019] and [Catalini et al, 2019] cited [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014]
and [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017]. On the other hand, there appears to be no excuse for [Lipton,
Hardjono and Pentland, 2018] (an academic journal article) not citing [Kakushadze and Liew,
2014] and [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017], especially considering that one of the authors of [Lipton,
Hardjono and Pentland, 2018] had an email correspondence about [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017]
with one of the authors of [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017] in January 2018.
20 The reserve basket is not intended to be actively managed [Catalini et al, 2019].
21 The forward discount for a given currency is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of
the spot FX rate over the forward FX rate.
22 See, e.g., [Cooper and Priestley, 2008], [Joslin and Konchitchki, 2018], [Joslin, Priebsch and
Singleton, 2014], [Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan, 2014], [Stambaugh, 1988], [Tille, Stoffels and
Gorbachev, 2001].
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basket). However, this actually does not address the main problem, to wit, that
“stability” is only meaningful w.r.t. a given numeraire, which usually defaults to
USD, the de facto stable currency of choice in countries with unstable currencies.23
Based on the foregoing, the idea of a broad currency basket,24 as appealing as
it may sound at first, apparently is too simplistic a solution and by no means a
panacea. In fact, the idea of using a currency basket (e.g., a basket of USD, EUR
and JPY) is not new and has its own issues (see, e.g., [Cooper, 2006], [Schmukler,
2006], [Welfens, 2006]). A diversified basket does not eliminate fluctuations of indi-
vidual currencies, so the prices of goods in Libra in any given country will fluctuate
with its fiat currency (and this is recognized in [The Libra Association, 2019], [Catal-
ini et al, 2019]). One of the hurdles to broad adoption is precisely this simple fact,
that if there are many free-floating fiat currencies around, such fluctuations in the
prices of goods is difficult to avoid. Thus, contrary to early unrealized expecta-
tions/predictions [Friedman, 1953], empirically FX rates fluctuate much more than
the prices of goods,25 and there is little that can be done about this apart from
implementing a USD/HKD-style target zone and achieving stability of prices in the
23 This is what [HKMA, 2011] states regarding possibly linking HKD to a basket of currencies
(instead of USD): “By linking to a basket of currencies, the domestic economy would be less
exposed to sharp swings in the exchange rate and interest rates of a single anchor currency. But
the system would be more complex and much less transparent. To the extent that the monetary
authority retained discretion to adjust the weights of the component currencies, transparency and
predictability would be reduced, possibly undermining confidence in the exchange rate system.”
24 According to [The Libra Association, 2019], “The assets in the Libra Reserve will be held
by a geographically distributed network of custodians with investment-grade credit rating to pro-
vide both security and decentralization of the assets.” While “decentralization” might appear
appealing, if (an equivalent of) a diverse basket of currencies is to be held in the reserve, it might
be much simpler, more efficient and less costly to use ETFs to achieve this. E.g., Invesco DB
G10 Currency Harvest Fund (ticker DBV) tracks Deutsche Bank G10 Currency Future Harvest
Index – Excess Return (note that DBV currently has only about $24M in the assets under man-
agement (AUM)); SPDR Barclays Capital Short Term International Treasury Bond ETF (ticker
BWZ) tracks Barclays Capital 1-3 Year Global Treasury ex-US Capped Index (BWZ currently has
about $293M in AUM); iShares 1-3 Year International Treasury Bond ETF (ticker ISHG) tracks
S&P/Citigroup International Treasury Bond Index Ex-US 1-3 Year (ISHG currently has about
$66M in AUM). There are additional ETFs based on all-duration developed country treasury bond
baskets, e.g.: SPDR Barclays International Treasury Bond (ticker BWX) tracks Barclays Capital
Global Treasury Ex-US Capped Index (BWX currently has about $1.14B in AUM); iShares Inter-
national Treasury Bond ETF (ticker IGOV) tracks S&P/Citigroup International Treasury Bond
Index Ex-US (IGOV currently has about $963 AUM); plus lower AUM ETFs (ticker IGVT with
about $11M in AUM, and ticker FLIA with about $5M in AUM). There is a host of U.S. Trea-
sury ETFs. In addition, there are currency-specific ETFs, including USD-specific ETFs such as
USD-bullish ETFs (ticker UUP with about $346M in AUM, and ticker USDU with about $43M in
AUM), and a USD-bearish ETF (ticker UDN with about $37M in AUM and down about 2.57%
YTD, whose constituents are EUR, JPY, GPB, CAD, SEK and CHF). Depending on the reserve
objectives, there are other ETFs that may also be suitable. However, once again, (an equivalent
of) a diversified currency basket may not be as desirable as it might appear at first (see above).
25 For some literature on this and related topics, see, e.g., [Baxter and Stockman, 1989], [Frankel
and Wei, 1993], [Goldberg and Klein, 1988], [Krugman, 1991], [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000], [Rogoff,
2001], and references therein.
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local currency (HKD) w.r.t. the reference currency (USD). This, however, cannot
achieve stability w.r.t. the entire plethora of various other currencies. Así es la vida.
Another issue with the Libra proposal is that, while the reserve collects the
interest paid by the underlying securities purchased with the fiat funds received
from the Libra holders, the latter do not receive any interest on their Libra holdings
at all [The Libra Association, 2019], [Catalini et al, 2019]. As such, this is nothing
but a vanilla carry trade, where the Libra Association members earn interest,26
while Libra holders do not. This is just pure arbitrage. It is unclear why large
institutional players would want to be arbitraged like this. The premise is that
certain “underbanked” retail users (presumably, with a large fraction coming from
developing countries) would find value in holding or transacting in Libra, and that
is supposed to be a justification enough to want to be arbitraged. Larger individual
or institutional players may wish to subject themselves to such arbitrage if their
intents are nefarious (money laundering, tax evasion, etc.). Either way, it is difficult
to see how any of the foregoing adds to the credibility or general appeal of the Libra
proposal. If shorting Libra is not the sole privilege of the Libra Association members
(if it is, then it means the Libra Association members just want to arbitrage the
rest of the world...) and if it is possible to do such shorting at a reasonably low
cost (including via forward contracts, futures, ETFs, options and other vehicles),
then there would be an arbitrage opportunity for others to execute this carry trade
putting possibly substantial selling pressure on Libra. It is difficult to see how this
can be avoided (again, unless the general public is restricted from shorting Libra).
Now we come to the most pressing issue with the Libra proposal: “The asso-
ciation does not set monetary policy... Since Libra will be global, the association
decided not to develop its own monetary policy but to inherit the policies of the
central banks represented in the basket” [Catalini et al, 2019]. This appears to im-
plicitly assume that Libra is expected to remain stable and trade in a narrow band
solely based on the fact that i) it is backed by a reserve, and ii) “the Libra Reserve
acts as a “buyer of last resort”” [The Libra Association, 2019]. It appears that, in
this regard, the Libra proposal (implicitly) assumes that: i) if Libra trades (sub-
stantially) lower than its “fair” (i.e., “reserve-based”) value, then the market will
buy Libra and push its price higher; and ii) if Libra trades (substantially) higher
than its aforesaid “fair” value, then the Libra Association members will sell more
Libra coins to the market and push its price lower. However, this is just way too
simplistic. Just because Libra is backed by a reserve, it does not guarantee that
such “arbitrage” argument is valid, as it does not take into account various impor-
tant aspects, including irrationality of the market. On the weak-side, there is no
26 In this regard, if the reserve is based on a diverse basket of short-term sovereign debt instru-
ments (as [The Libra Association, 2019], [Catalini et al, 2019] appear to propose), some of these
instruments might not even pay interest in the context of the negative interest rate environments in
various jurisdictions. For some literature on negative rates and related topics, see, e.g., [Arteta et
al, 2017], [Bech and Malkhozov, 2016], [Buiter, 2009], [Jobst and Lin, 2016], [Kimball, 2015], [Lopez
et al, 2018], [Ullersma, 2002], [van Riet, 2017], [Yates, 2004], and references therein.
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guarantee that the market will want to buy more Libra just because it is “cheap”.
On the strong-side, there is no guarantee that the Libra Association members will
place more of their fiat funds into the reserve to mint new Libra coins to sell to the
market: not only is there risk involved in this, but there could be liquidity issues
as the Libra Association members do not have unlimited resources (see below) and
unlike central banks cannot create money out of thin air. Furthermore, unless the
Libra Association members are obligated to do so, expecting them to do this on their
own, without a stringent mechanism in place, is simply too generous an assumption.
We do not have to go far to see that these are serious issues. Thus, HKD is fully
backed by a USD reserve. In fact, as of the end of July 2019, the HKMA Exchange
Fund balance was HK$3,686.2 billion, while the Monetary Base was HK$1,633.1
billion (see https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/press-releases/
2019/20190814-3.shtml). The Backing Ratio, defined as the Backing Assets (a
part of the Exchange Fund) divided by the Monetary Base (comprising Certificates
of Indebtedness, Government issued currency notes and coins in circulation, the bal-
ance of the banking system and Exchange Fund Bills and Notes issued) was 109.9%
on Dec 31, 2018 [HKMA, 2019]. Yet, as discussed above, HKMA had to intervene
whopping 27 times in 2018 on the weak-side to prevent HKD from breaching the
band (see above). Backing a currency by a reserve is simply insufficient for keep-
ing its exchange rate in a target zone. Volatility can be caused by rational as well
as irrational market participants, reactions to the news, etc. Furthermore, as dis-
cussed above, FX rates fluctuate much more than the prices of goods. Thus, one
can take an “asset” view of exchange rates, whereby a currency is a durable and
its price reflects future flows, not just its transactions value at a given time, so it is
not surprising that FX rates fluctuate so much (cf. stocks). And the feedback of
these fluctuations into the economy is damped (among other things) by trade costs,
including tariffs, transport costs, costs related to differences in languages and legal
systems, etc. (see, e.g., [Rogoff, 2001] and references therein). Fiat currencies of
large democracies are backed by their governments (that wield their taxing power,
etc.). Yet, their currencies fluctuate. HKD is fully backed by USD, yet it fluctuates
and is kept inside the target zone by HKMA’s monetary interventions, not just the
fact that it is backed by USD. Fundamentally there is no reason why Libra would be
any more stable than many (developed countries’) fiat currencies.27 If the market
perceives that there is a potential future problem with Libra’s backing, its reserve,
any of the major members of the Libra Association, etc., the market will not hes-
27 If anything, a priori it could be expected to be less stable. Thus, notwithstanding stratospheric
market capitalizations of some of Libra’s backers, these are not liquid funds. In fact, the initial
contributions of the Libra Association members are only $10M each [The Libra Association, 2019],
which even with the target number of 100 members is only $1B. With the ambition to become
a global currency, it would take a much, much larger reserve to sustain Libra. Is this reserve
supposed to be raised from Libra users? Then how is this any different from many of the ubiquitous
cryptocurrency, digital coin and token projects designed to raise money from the public with no
tangible prospects of returns? Furthermore, if this is the case, then it only makes the optics that
this is an attempt at arbitraging the rest of the world through a carry trade (see above) even worse.
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itate to sell, sell, sell. Similarly, if the market believes that Libra will have future
value beyond what it is backed with, the market will not hesitate to buy, buy, buy.
Bitcoin is not backed by any reserve and on the face of it has no intrinsic value, but
this has not stopped the market – whether rationally or irrationally – from trading
Bitcoin in an unfathomably wide range. Backing Libra with a reserve but without
a well-defined monetary policy will not prevent its price from fluctuating wildly.28
To reiterate, being backed by other assets does not confine a currency into a
narrow band. The only relevant “arbitrage” argument is that of UIRP (and not
that a currency is backed by a reserve), and even that is not failproof as deviations
from UIRP occur all the time (see, e.g., references in fn. 16). In terms of UIRP,
the “no-arbitrage” argument goes as follows (note that deviations from UIRP do
not give rise to risk-free arbitrage). The expected rate of return of a cash bond
in the domestic currency (e.g., USD), when expressed in the units of the foreign
currency (e.g., HKD), must be the same as the expected rate of return of the same
investment in a cash bond in the foreign currency, or else an arbitrage opportunity
occurs via a vanilla carry trade (by borrowing the currency with a lower rate of return
and lending the currency with a higher rate of return). In the context of a target
zone this translates into an interest rate “peg” between the band-confined currency
(HKD) and the free-floating reference currency (USD). And this peg is instituted by
the monetary authority of the confined currency (e.g., HKMA in the case of HKD).
However, as we discuss in detail in Appendix A, the ideal peg is feasible only in
low-volatility environments. If the FX rate volatility is high (notwithstanding the
band, i.e., if the FX rate fluctuates with a high frequency within the band), the ideal
peg dictated by UIRP would require unrealistically high interest rates on the strong
side, and (possibly large) negative interest rates on the weak side. Intuitively, this
can be understood as being due to the fact that the interest rate peg basically has to
reflect the risk premium due to high volatility. In realistic high-volatility scenarios
(and there is no reason to expect Libra not to fit this profile) the limited peg that
can be realistically instituted invariably allows carry trade arbitrage, so the band
can be breached.29 This is precisely what happened with HKD in 2018 [HKMA,
2019], where rising U.S. interest rates put pressure on and weakened HKD to the
point that HKMA had to intervene 27 times (see above) to prevent it from breaching
the band. The role of the monetary authority and its interventions through a robust
monetary policy cannot be underestimated. Without such a monetary policy and
interventions, there is no reason to believe that Libra will stay in a narrow band.
28 Consider this. As a Gedankenexperiment (thought experiment), imagine that – magically –
starting tomorrow Bitcoin is backed by USD reserves such that each BTC is backed by one USD.
Does this mean that the BTC price will immediately drop to 1 USD? Of course not! Such backing
might introduce some volatility in the short term (then again, BTC is already extremely volatile),
but the market will continue to trade BTC at values it perceives to be “right” at any given time.
29 As mentioned above, according to [The Libra Association, 2019], the interest earned on Libra
is simply zero. Then, unless only the Libra Association members are allowed to short Libra and
other market participants are precluded from doing so – that would be a tough pill to swallow –
there will be carry trade arbitrage opportunities (see above) putting downward pressure on Libra.
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A lot of attention has gone to regulatory hurdles with Libra. However, even if
the regulatory issues magically went away overnight, as it sits, the Libra proposal
appears to be too simplistic to work. The consortium idea is sound – as mentioned
above, in the context of iCurrency, this was proposed in [Kakushadze and Liew,
2017]. The idea of backing a currency with traditional assets is not new and is
sound – HKD is a testament to this – albeit, as discussed above, backing Libra
with a reserve (effectively comprised) of a diverse basket of fiat currencies is not
without potential drawbacks (see above). The idea of having a currency trade in a
narrow target zone is also sound – in the context of iCurrency, this was also proposed
in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017] – however, the apparent lack of a monetary policy
to keep Libra confined to a band in the Libra proposal simply will not work (see
above). The bottom line is that, over many decades, a lot of very smart people
(including Nobel laureates) have thought about these and related issues extensively,
and expecting what appears to be a rather simplistic proposal to cut it is a bit naïve.
Libra is an interesting idea in the sense that, if it were to succeed at a global
scale, it might be a contender for iCurrency that is backed by a consortium of private
entities rather than governments (which is the proposal of [Kakushadze and Liew,
2017]). The consortium idea, be it comprised of private entities or governments as
its members, is appealing as it eliminates the need for wasteful (in terms of energy
consumption) mining (as in, e.g., Bitcoin).30 In some sense, the HKD system (LERS
– see above) is a quasi-consortium system as the HKD notes are issued by three
commercial banks along with the Hong Kong Government (see above), albeit the
monetary policy is implemented solely by HKMA (and not the banks). However, as
mentioned above, some aspects of the Libra proposal appear to have shortcomings.
In terms of implementing a target zone for iCurrency (and by this we do not mean
Libra),31 it would appear to make little sense to try to reinvent the wheel. The HKD
system (LERS) has worked well for over 35 years and weathered various precarious
situations such as the Hong Kong stock market crash of 1987, the Asian financial
crisis of 1997/98, the global financial crisis of 2008, etc. Clearly, it works. Therefore,
it would make sense to implement the same or very similar system for iCurrency. The
process of monetary policy intervention at the boundaries of the target zone “is very
much an automatic mechanism” [HKMA, 2011]. So it can be made 100% algorithmic
to comply with criterion 4) for iCurrency (see the four criteria for iCurrency at the
beginning of this paper). And, notwithstanding expected political and other issues,
it is natural to expect that it would be easier to overcome regulatory hurdles if a
broad consortium of governments issues iCurrency as opposed to private entities,
30 For some literature on inefficiency and unsustainability issues, see, e.g, [Bariviera, 2017],
[Kostakis and Giotitsas, 2014], [Nadarajah and Chu, 2017], [Urquhart, 2016], [Vranken, 2017].
31 For the sake of completeness, let us mention that stabilization in the context of iCurrency
is not to be confused with the so-called stablecoins, which have had their own host of issues (see,
e.g., [Chung, 2018], [Irrera, 2018], [Lian, 2018], [Popper, 2018], [Robinson and Leising, 2018]). For
some literature on stablecoins, see, e.g., [Griffin and Shams, 2018], [Mita et al, 2019], [Pernice et
al, 2019], [Saito and Iwamura, 2018], [Senner and Sornette, 2018], [Zhang et al, 2019].
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albeit if the governments do not or cannot get their act together, an attempt by
a private consortium is certainly a welcome development. In fact, as this paper
was being finalized, multiple outlets32 reported that, in his speech [Carney, 2019]
at the Jackson Hole Symposium 2019, the Governor of the Bank of England Mark
Carney floated the idea of iCurrency (which he referred to as “Synthetic Hegemonic
Currency”)33 issued by a network of central banks. So, is the writing on the wall?34
Quoting from [Kakushadze and Liew, 2014]: “If mankind is destined to make it
to Mars (and beyond) and establish extraterrestrial colonies in our solar system, a
universal currency devoid of government control and other forms of manipulation
would appear to be a necessity, rather than wishful thinking. Therefore, we propose
our criteria 1-4 above as the requirements not only for a universal numeraire for
iGDP, but also for any universal world currency that mankind is very likely destined
to adapt, considering the global nature of the world economy and our otherworldly
aspirations. Cryptocurrencies, as pioneers of algorithmic and digital currency, might
be positioned to fill this role, perhaps in the not-so-distant future. Only time will
tell.” It looks like these seemingly utopian ideas might actually be coming to life!
Our discussion above is purposefully kept nontechnical to appeal to a broad
readership base. However, various important conclusions we reach above (including
an essential inference that monetary policy interventions are paramount to keeping
the exchange rate from breaching the band) are supported by (not-so-elementary)
math, which we present in Appendix A, parts of which are based on a prior (also
rich with math) paper [Carr and Kakushadze, 2015] on FX options in target zones.
A FX in Target Zone
The first two subsections of this section follow a condensed version of the discussion
in [Carr and Kakushadze, 2015], which contains more detail on FX target zones and
a number of references (which we do not repeat here).
A.1 Differential Rate
Let us assume that the domestic currency (e.g., USD) is freely traded with no
restrictions, whereas the foreign currency (e.g., HKD or a cryptocurrency) trades
inside a target zone. We have a domestic cash bond Bdt and a foreign cash bond
Bft . We also have the exchange rate St, which, for our purposes here, is the worth
of one unit of the domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency (e.g., in our
USD/HKD example, St is the HKD worth of 1 USD, whose target zone of 7.75 to
32 See, e.g., [De, 2019], [Inman, 2019], [Lewis, 2019].
33 iCurrency sounds so much better!
34 As pointed out in [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017], government-issued cryptocurrencies may be a
step forward (not backward) toward iCurrency. Russia’s CryptoRuble (see [Kakushadze and Liew,
2017]) has not materialized (yet). However, there have been rumors of Chinese government-issued
cryptocurrency being ready to be released (possibly soon), see, e.g., [del Castillo, 2019].
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7.85 is set by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), Hong Kong’s currency
board). We will refer to tradables denominated in the foreign (domestic) currency
as foreign (domestic) tradables. Say we are interested in pricing derivatives (e.g.,
FX options, bonds or other instruments) from a foreign investor’s perspective. The
foreign cash bond Bft is a foreign tradable; however, Bdt and St are not. We can
construct another foreign tradable via35
S˜t = Bdt St (1)
The discounted process, which must be a martingale under the risk-neutral measure,
call it Q, is given by
Zt = (Bft )−1S˜t = B−1t St (2)
where
Bt = Bft /Bdt (3)
The price of a claim YT at time T is given by (Ft is the filtration (or the history)
up to time t, and E(·) denotes expectation)
V˜t = Bft E
(
(BfT )−1YT
)
Q,Ft
(4)
The foreign monetary authority, which confines the foreign currency to the target
zone, (in theory) also adjusts (“pegs”) the foreign interest rates based on the domes-
tic interest rates and the FX rate. Therefore, we can assume that the domestic cash
bond Bft is deterministic within the (short enough) time horizons we are interested
in for the purpose of pricing FX derivatives.36 For the claim price we then have
V˜t = Bdt (BdT )−1Vt (5)
Vt = Bt E
(
B−1T YT
)
Q,Ft
(6)
Note that Bt defined in (3) is the ratio of the two cash bonds. We can define the
corresponding differential (or “effective”) short-rate process via:
rt =
d ln(Bt)
dt
= rft − rdt (7)
where rft and rdt are the foreign and domestic short-rate processes:
rft =
d ln(Bft )
dt
(8)
rdt =
d ln(Bdt )
dt
(9)
35 In our USD/HKD example, this is the HKD value of the USD cash bond.
36 More generally, we can assume that any volatility in the domestic bond Bdt is uncorrelated with
the volatility in the FX rate St and the volatility in the foreign bond Bft , or, more precisely, any
such correlation is negligible at relevant time horizons. This would not alter any of the subsequent
discussions or conclusions, so for the sake of simplicity we will assume that Bdt is deterministic.
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Note, however, that rt need not be positive. Also, here we are assuming that rdt
is deterministic; however, rft is not, nor is rt. With this assumption, using (5), we
can compute the actual price V˜t of the claim YT by computing the would-be “price”
Vt of the claim YT with St and Bt playing the roles of the tradable and the cash
bond, respectively. In the following, for the sake of notational and terminological
convenience and brevity,37 we refer to Bt as the cash bond, rt as the short-rate, and
Vt as the claim price; also, we refer to the FX rate St as FXR.
A.2 Boundaries
The boundaries in the target zone make things trickier compared with when we have
an unbounded FXR process. Here we consider a target zone with attainable bound-
aries, i.e., the FXR process St is confined between a lower bound S− and an upper
bound S+, and it can at times take these values (cf. unattainable boundaries).38
This requires appropriate boundary conditions to be imposed at the boundaries (see
below), which in turn implies that the FXR process St cannot be a (geometric)
Brownian motion with a drift. Instead, it must be realized as a nontrivial nonlinear
function of some underlying stochastic process Xt.
This can be achieved as follows. Let us consider the process (here Wt is a Q-
Brownian motion)
dXt = σ(Xt)dWt + µ(Xt)dt (10)
where σ(x) and µ(x) have no explicit time dependence.39 In fact, for our purposes
here, motivated by analytical tractability, it will suffice to consider constant σ(x) ≡
σ. However, for now we will keep µ(x) general (but Lipschitz continuous). We will
now introduce barriers for the process Xt at Xt = x− and Xt = x+. Below, without
loss of generality, we will assume x− < x+. The FXR process is then given by
St = f(Xt), where f(x) is a bounded monotonic40 function on [x−, x+] such that
f(x±) = S±. In this regard, St cannot have any explicit t dependence,41 i.e., St
depends on t only via Xt.
This has two immediate consequences. Thus, we have
dSt = f ′(Xt)σdWt +
[
µ(Xt)f ′(Xt) +
σ2
2 f
′′(Xt)
]
dt (11)
37 Alternatively, we can set rdt to zero, so Bt is the same as the foreign cash bond B
f
t , and restore
the (deterministic) rdt dependence at the end by multiplying all derivative prices by Bdt (BdT )−1.
38 In practice the exchange rates in target zones frequently attain the boundaries, so attainable
boundaries, which we focus on here, are more realistic and appealing from this viewpoint. In fact,
in some cases the FX options markets imply a future expectation that the FX rate will break the
band. For academic literature on unattainable boundaries, see [Carr and Kakushadze, 2015].
39 We consider time-homogeneous dynamics so the problem is analytically tractable (see below).
40 Monotonicity is assumed so there is a 1-to-1 correspondence between St and Xt. Otherwise,
among other things, we could not price claims, etc. (see below).
41 Otherwise, barring any contrived time dependence, St generically will break the band.
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where f ′(x) = ∂xf(x). On the other hand, recall that Zt in (2) is a martingale
under the risk-neutral measure Q. Taking into account (7), it then follows that
the differential rate rt cannot be arbitrary but must be a deterministic function of
Xt (and it has no explicit time dependence, only through Xt) given by rt = r(Xt),
where
r(x) = µ(x)f
′(x)
f(x) +
σ2
2
f ′′(x)
f(x) (12)
Furthermore, we must have reflecting (Neumann) boundary conditions for f(x) at
x±:
f ′(x±) = 0 (13)
Indeed, intuitively, with any other boundary conditions (absorbing, that is, Dirichlet;
or Robin, i.e., mixed) the volatility f ′(Xt)σ in (11) would be nonvanishing at the
boundaries and this would imply that the process St cannot stay in the target
zone.42 Another way of phrasing this is that, unless we have the reflecting boundary
conditions (13), the identity process It ≡ 1 cannot be a martingale and probability
would invariably leak through the barriers [Carr and Kakushadze, 2015].
Let us note that (12) is a consequence of Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIRP)
(see fn. 16). Indeed, Zt defined in (2) being a martingale is equivalent to stating
that the instantaneous rate of return of S˜t is the same as that of the foreign cash
bond Bft . On the other hand, S˜t, which is given by (1), is the worth of the domestic
cash bond in the foreign currency. I.e., Zt being a martingale, which implies (12),
is the statement that the domestic and foreign cash bonds have the same rate of
return (in foreign currency), which is nothing but UIRP.
A.3 “Pegged” Interest Rate
So, (at least in theory) the foreign monetary authority (HKMA in the case of HKD)
“pegs” the foreign interest rates to the domestic ones to reflect the premium/discount
between the exchange rate St w.r.t. a reference rate, call it S∗. Assuming that the
band is symmetrical is not critical here, but we will do so in the following to simplify
the discussion. We can set x± = ±L, f(0) = S∗, and S+ − S∗ = S∗ − S−. Also, let
f(x) = S∗ [1 + γh(x)] (14)
where h(−x) = −h(x) takes values in [1,−1] (i.e., h(±L) = ±1), and γ = |S±/S∗−
1|  1 is the relative half-width of the band.
The ideal interest rate peg then is given by rft = rdt + rt, where rt = r(Xt)
and the function r(x) is given by (12). However, Xt is not an observable process,
only St = f(Xt) is.43 So, in practice the foreign monetary authority would have to
42 Recall that dWt is of order
√
dt, so, unless the volatility f(Xt)σ vanishes at the boundaries,
no drift term can compensate the stochastic term in (11) breaking through the barriers.
43 Albeit, since f(x) is a monotonic function on [x−, x+], there is a 1-to-1 correspondence
between Xt and St. Without this, the peg would not be possible, nor would it be possible to price
options, e.g., calls and puts on FXR [Carr and Kakushadze, 2015].
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choose some function ρ of the observable FXR process St, i.e., rt = ρ(St). Then (12)
becomes a differential equation for f(x):
σ2
2
f ′′(x)
f(x) + µ(x)
f ′(x)
f(x) − ρ(f(x)) = 0 (15)
If we stick to the symmetrical target zone (14), then, to the leading order in γ, we
can assume that ρ(S∗ + y) = −ρ(S∗ − y). Also, consistently with UIRP, ρ(S+) < 0
and ρ(S−) > 0: indeed, when the foreign currency is weak (strong), the foreign
interest rate must be lower (higher) than the domestic one.
A simple choice44 is given by
ρ(y) = r∗
[
1− y
S∗
]
(16)
where r∗ is a constant to be determined. The differential equation (15) then takes
the following form:
σ2
2 f
′′(x) + µ(x)f ′(x)− r∗f(x)
[
1− f(x)
S∗
]
= 0 (17)
Thus, e.g., for vanishing drift µ(x) ≡ 0, (17) simplifies to
σ2
2 f
′′(x)− r∗f(x)
[
1− f(x)
S∗
]
= 0 (18)
This equation can be solved in terms of Jacobi elliptic functions. Thus, the equation
∂2uφ = 2− 4(1 +m)φ+ 6mφ2 (19)
is solved by φ(u) = sn2(u|m), where sn(u|m) is the Jacobi elliptic function, and m is
the elliptic parameter.45 However, precisely because the target zone is narrow, i.e.,
because γ  1, the solution is actually well-approximated by elementary functions.
A.4 Vanishing Drift
In the case of vanishing drift µ(x) ≡ 0, the dynamics of the process Xt inside the
band is purely stochastic. This can be interpreted, among other things, as the
absence of any intervention from the foreign monetary authority, i.e., no monetary
policy is applied to the exchange rate inside the band (which is what one expects
to be the case, at least in theory – see below). We can solve (18) as follows. Note
that γ  1 in (14). Then, to the leading order in γ, we have
σ2
2 h
′′(x) + r∗h = 0 (20)
44 The explicit form of ρ(y) is not critical to our discussion here.
45 See, e.g., [Abramowitz and Stegun, 1964], [Carlson, 2006], [DFML, 2019], [Johannessen, 2018].
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subject to the Neumann boundary conditions (13) (also, recall that h(x) = −h(−x),
and we normalize h(x) such that h(±L) = ±1):
h′(±L) = 0 (21)
The solution is given by
h(x) = sin
(
pix
2L
)
(22)
r(x) = −γr∗h(x) (23)
r∗ = r0 (24)
r0 =
pi2σ2
8L2 (25)
So, the differential rate must take (positive and negative) values with the absolute
value of order γr∗. To put this into perspective, we must pick a time horizon T ,
which we take to be 1 year. In the case of USD/HKD, we have γ = 0.05/7.80, so
γr∗ ≈ 0.79%× σ
2
L2
(26)
If the volatility were such that σ
√
T ∼ L, then the foreign interest rate swings (26)
due to the peg would be within a reasonable range. However, in practice FXR can
swing in the target zone from one boundary to another many times in 1 year, so
we actually have σ
√
T = βL, where the factor β ∼ √K roughly accounts for the
number K of such swings per annum and generally we can have β  1 (if K is
large).46 Then the foreign interest rate swings (26) could be too large (∼ γβ2) to be
realistic. This implies that without a drift the “no arbitrage” (i.e., UIRP) condition
(12) cannot be satisfied in a high-volatility environment.
A.5 Nonvanishing Drift
With a nonvanishing drift, there is more structure. Let r(x) be given by (16). To
the leading order in γ we have
σ2
2 h
′′(x) + µ(x)h′(x) + r∗h(x) = 0 (27)
Let us define
ψ(x) = exp
(
1
σ2
∫ x
x−
dy µ(y)
)
h(x) (28)
46 Thus, consider a simple discrete-time model, where time t = 1, 2, . . . , T is measured in days,
and Xt can only take two values, +L and −L (albeit Xt+1 need not be equal −Xt, it can also be
equal Xt). Assuming no drift (i.e., the average of Xt for large T is zero), the daily variance σ2 is
given by KL2/(T − 1), where K is the number of times Xt+1 = −Xt (so, then T − 1 −K is the
number of times Xt+1 = Xt). So, the annualized volatility σ
√
T ≈ L√K.
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The equation for ψ(x) then reads:
−σ
2
2 ψ
′′(x) + V (x)ψ(x) = Eψ(x) (29)
where E = r∗ and
V (x) = µ
2(x)
2σ2 +
µ′(x)
2 (30)
Also, we have the following boundary conditions (which follow from (13))
ψ′(x±) =
µ(x±)
σ2
ψ(x±) (31)
So, (29) is the Schrödinger equation [Schrödinger, 1926] for a particle in a 1-
dimensional box in the potential V (x). In fact, this potential corresponds to su-
persymmetric quantum mechanics (see, e.g., [Bernstein and Brown, 1984], [March-
esoni, Sodano and Zannetti, 1988], [Witten, 1981]), so its spectrum is nonnegative.
Due to the boundary conditions (31), we have a discrete spectrum of energy levels
(eigenvalues) E = En, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; the ground level has zero energy E0 = 0 with
the eigenfunction ψ0(x) given by (a0 is a normalization constant)
ψ0(x) = a0 exp
(
1
σ2
∫ x
x−
dy µ(y)
)
(32)
Here we are interested in the first excited level with the energy E1, whose eigenfunc-
tion ψ1(x) has just one node, i.e., it vanishes only for one value of x in [x−, x+] (see
above). This solution and the value of E1 depend on the functional form of the drift
µ(x). Based on our discussion above, ideally we wish to find configurations with the
lowest possible E1 = r∗, as this would minimize the foreign interest rate swings.
At first it might seem that a mean-reverting drift is what we need to decrease r∗.
This (misguidedly) would appear to be the case based on the observation that for a
mean-reverting drift the potential V (x) would be lower compared with a “momen-
tum” drift. E.g., if µ(x) = −αx, where α > 0, then Xt is a mean-reverting Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (OU) process [Uhlenbeck and Ornstein, 1930] (with the long-run mean
equal 0), and the potential is given by V (x) = 12 [−α + α2x2/σ2]. Its “momentum”
counterpart drift µ(x) = αx has a higher potential V (x) = 12 [α + α
2x2/σ2], which
naïvely might appear to result in higher r∗ = E1.
However, the above reasoning is flawed. This is because E1 is not only sensitive
to V (x), but also (and more so – see below) to the boundary conditions (31), which
are affected by the choice of µ(x). To understand the dependence of E1 on µ(x), let
us take the above linear drift µ(x) = αx (where α > 0, and  = −1 corresponds to
mean-reversion, while  = +1 corresponds to “momentum”)47 and assume that α is
small, that is, α  r0. Then the first term in the potential (30) is subleading and
47 We use “momentum” in quotation marks as the drift µ(x) has nontrivial x-dependence.
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can be neglected, i.e., the potential is approximately constant. The desired solution
is given by (a1 is a normalization constant)
ψ1(x) = a1 sin(ωx) (33)
E1 =
1
2
[
α + σ2ω2
]
(34)
Now, ω is determined from the boundary conditions (31). Straightforward algebra
gives (to the first order in α/r0)
ω = pi2L −
2αL
piσ2
(35)
So, we have (again, to the first order in α/r0)
E1 = r0 − α2 (36)
So, the mean-reverting drift ( = −1) increases E1, while it is the “momentum” drift
( = +1) that decreases it. This is because the increase (decrease) in ω for  = −1
( = +1) due to the boundary conditions (31) overweighs the decrease (increase)
in the potential. We arrived at this conclusion for small α. When α is not small,
the solution to (29) involves parabolic cylinder functions and E1 can be computed
numerically as a function of α. However, on general grounds we expect that, as α
increases, the ratio E1/r0 is reduced (for  = +1) down from 1 by some factor κ ∼ 1.
This can be seen explicitly by considering simpler drifts. Thus, let us take
µ(x) = νσ2sign(x), where ν > 0 is a constant. So, we have a constant drift on
each side of x = 0. (The discontinuity in the drift does not pose a problem. We
will consider smooth drifts below.) As above, for  = −1 ( = +1) we have mean-
reversion (“momentum”). The potential is given by V (x) = σ22 [2νδ(x) + ν
2]. So,
it is a constant potential augmented with a delta-function spike at x = 0. The
delta-function affects even levels En, n = 0, 2, 4, . . . ; however, it does not affect the
odd levels En, n = 1, 3, . . . , as for such levels we have ψn(0) = 0. So, the solution
for ψ1(x) is given by (a1 is a normalization constant)
ψ1(x) = a1 sin(ωx) (37)
E1 =
σ2
2
[
ν2 + ω2
]
(38)
As above, ω is determined from the boundary conditions (31):
ω cot(ωL) = ν (39)
Then for  = −1 we have ω > pi/2L, while for  = +1 we have ω < pi/2L, i.e., a
mean-reversion (“momentum”) drift increases (decreases) ω. For small ν  1/L we
have (to the first order in ν)
ω = pi2L −
2ν
pi
(40)
E1 = r0
[
1− 8νL
pi2
]
(41)
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So, as in the linear drift case above, mean-reversion (“momentum”) increases (de-
creases) E1. We can solve (39) numerically for values of ν that are not small. For
 = −1 we have E1 > r0. For  = +1, as ν increases, E1 decreases until the limiting
value ν = 1/L, for which the solution is actually linear (and is obtained from (37)
in the limit ω → 0, a1 →∞, a˜1 = a1ω = finite):
ψ1(x) = a˜1x (42)
E1 =
4r0
pi2
≈ 0.41× r0 (43)
For ν > 1/L (39) has no roots ( = +1), so (43) is the lowest value for this drift.
As mentioned above, the sign(x) discontinuity in the drift does not pose a prob-
lem. However, we can consider a smooth “momentum” drift of the form µ(x) =
νσ2 tanh(νx), for which we have a constant potential V (x) = 12σ
2ν2. So, the solu-
tion is still given by (37) and (38), but the boundary conditions (31) now read
ω cot(ωL) = ν tanh(νL) (44)
For small ν  1/L we have (to the first order in ν2)
ω = pi2L −
2ν2L
pi
(45)
E1 = r0
[
1− 8ν
2L2
pi2
]
(46)
We can solve (44) numerically for values of ν that are not small. As above, the
lowest E1 corresponds to the aforementioned limit ω → 0 (where we have the linear
solution (42)), which occurs when νL tanh(νL) = 1 at ν ≈ 1.20/L:
E1 ≈ 0.58× r0 (47)
For completeness, let us also note that the mean-reversion analog of the “momen-
tum” drift µ(x) = νσ2 tanh(νx) is given by µ(x) = −νσ2 tan(νx), where ν > 0. For
this drift we invariably have E1 > r0.
So, while naïvely it might have seemed that mean-reverting drifts would aid in
lowering r∗, they have exactly the opposite effect, and it is in fact “momentum”
drifts that do the job. An intuitive way of thinking about this is as follows. Mean-
reverting drifts actually increase the effective volatility as the process Xt bounces
back and forth between the boundaries more (compared with the vanishing drift
case), i.e., they effectively increase the factor β ∼ √K (see above). On the other
hand, “momentum” drifts push Xt toward the boundaries and make it spend more
time thereat, thereby effectively decreasing β ∼ √K. Furthermore, in high-volatility
environments a realistic value of r∗ based on the foreign interest rate policy will
have sizably lower implied volatility than that required by the no-arbitrage condi-
tion (12). That is, realistically, in high-volatility environments there should exist
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arbitrage opportunities.48 However, these are not necessarily vanilla FX carry trade
opportunities: indeed, if, as in (16), rt = r∗ [1− St/S∗], then there is no vanilla
FX carry trade (ignoring any transaction costs, tax considerations, etc.), where one
would borrow (lend) the domestic currency and lend (borrow) the foreign currency
and hold a static position. This is because the differential rate rt is pegged to FXR
– albeit possibly more weakly than the no-arbitrage condition (12) would require –
and its sign can flip. Instead, the arbitrage opportunity here is dynamic.
To understand this, let us assume that f(x) is such that it satisfies (17) with
some r∗. Let us further assume that the foreign monetary authority pegs the foreign
interest rate such that rt = r∗∗ [1− St/S∗], where r∗∗ < r∗, in fact, r∗∗ could even
be sizably smaller than r∗ (see above). Recall that the foreign tradable S˜t = Bdt St
is the value of the domestic bond in the foreign currency. Assuming (17), the
instantaneous rate of return of S˜t is given by r˜t = rdt + r∗ [1− St/S∗]. Since by
definition rt = rft − rdt , it then follows that r˜t > rft when St < S∗, and r˜t < rft
when St > S∗. So, the arbitrage strategy (again, ignoring transaction costs, taxes,
etc.) then consists of being long the domestic bond and short the foreign bond when
St < S∗, and being short the domestic bond and long the foreign bond when St > S∗.
So, this is a dynamic combination of two opposite carry trades depending on where
FXR is w.r.t. S∗. However, the existence of this arbitrage opportunity (which may
or may not be actionable once transaction costs, tax considerations, etc., are taken
into account) does not necessarily compel the foreign monetary authority to peg the
foreign interest rate with an unrealistic value of r∗ (if the volatility σ is high enough,
that is) as there are other more important economic considerations at stake. Thus,
deviations from UIRP and the corresponding carry trades exist for some FX pairs
and there have been many academic papers (for a partial list, see, e.g., the literature
cited in fn. 16 and references therein) written on the so-called “Forward Discount
Puzzle”, which nonetheless do not make it go away.
So, as we saw above, mean-reversion inside the band exacerbates the volatil-
ity/differential rate issue, while “momentum” makes it milder. This might seem
puzzling at first, as it would make no sense that the foreign monetary authority
would induce “momentum”-like behavior inside the band via its monetary policy
interventions. And (at least in theory) it does not and should not. Assuming FXR
is allowed to float freely inside the target zone, the foreign monetary authority has
no business in controlling FXR’s behavior inside the band. Instead, its primary con-
cern and responsibility is to make sure that FXR does not breach the band, which
is achieved via monetary policy interventions at the boundaries of the target zone.
We will discuss this below in a moment. Before we do this, however, let us mention
a very simple way of reducing the volatility.
Consider a discrete setup, where St can only take two values, S+ and S−, but
the values between S+ and S− are not permitted. This is basically a scenario where
there is a market-maker (or multiple ones) that are willing to buy each unit of the
48 By “arbitrage” we do not mean risk-free arbitrage. Deviations from UIRP are not risk-free
arbitrage opportunities (see above).
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domestic currency at S− (the bid) and sell it at S+ (the ask). If the bid-ask spread
is large enough, then aggressive order flow is not cheap and this will typically reduce
the volatility, i.e., the process St will spend considerable amount of time at S+ or
S−. This may not be a very “democratic” setup and might be argued to defy the
idea behind having free-floating FXR inside the band. However, a priori, it could
be a viable scenario if reducing the volatility is the goal.
A.6 Intervention at the Boundaries
To ensure that FXR does not breach the band, the foreign monetary authority must
intervene at the boundaries, i.e., when St hits S+ or S−. When St = S+, the foreign
currency is weak and there is pressure for it to become weaker. To prevent this,
the foreign monetary authority buys the foreign currency (i.e., reduces its supply)
to stabilize it. Similarly, when St = S−, the foreign currency is strong and there is
pressure for it to become stronger. To prevent this, the foreign monetary authority
sells the foreign currency (i.e., increases its supply) to stabilize it. In particular, this
is how HKMA operates in the case of USD/HKD.
So, how can we model this monetary intervention at the boundaries? To begin
with, let us note that a priori we can build an infinite number of such models by
choosing the drift (see below). However, the idea behind them is the same. Instead
of confining the process Xt to the interval [x−, x+] (see above), we can let Xt take
values on the entire real line R. However, we can effectively confine the process Xt
to [x−, x+] by having a large mean-reverting drift outside this interval. In fact, for
our discussion here what happens inside this interval is of no import, so for the sake
of simplicity we can assume vanishing drift µ(x) = 0 for x− < x < x+, but it is
nonvanishing outside this interval (as above, we will set x± = ±L):
µ(x) = ξσ2 [θ(−x− L)− θ(x− L)] (48)
where θ(y) is the Heaviside step-function. Here we are going to assume that ξL 1,
so we have a large mean-reverting drift outside the boundaries located at x± = ±L.
The potential is given by
V (x) = σ
2
2
[
−ξδ(x+ L)− ξδ(x− L) + ξ2θ(−x− L) + ξ2θ(x− L)
]
(49)
The solution to (29) for the first excited level E1 = r∗ is given by (ψ1(−x) = −ψ1(x)):
ψ1(x) = a1 sin(ωx), 0 ≤ x ≤ L (50)
ψ1(x) = a1 sin(ωL) exp(−λ(x− L)), x ≥ L (51)
λ =
√
ξ2 − ω2 ≈ ξ − pi
2
8ξL2 (52)
sin(2ωL) = ω
ξ
⇒ ω ≈ pi2L
[
1− 12ξL
]
(53)
E1 =
σ2ω2
2 (54)
20
where a1 is a normalization constant. So, using (28), we have (again, recall that
h(−x) = −h(x)):49
h(x) = sin(ωx)sin(ωL) , 0 ≤ x ≤ L (55)
h(x) = exp [(ξ − λ)(x− L)] ≈ exp
[
pi2(x− L)
8ξL2
]
, x ≥ L (56)
where, as above, we have normalized h(x) such that h(±L) = ±1. So, as desired,
h(x) is a monotonically increasing function of x; however, for |x| > L it increases
very slowly (recall that ξL 1), which is due to the large negative drift for x > L
and large positive drift for x < −L. In the limit ξ → ∞, h(x) flattens at |x| > L,
so we have reflecting barriers. This neatly models the intervention by the foreign
monetary authority at the boundaries. Also, note that we must have ξ > 0 for the
above solution to exist, i.e., we must have (strong) mean-reversion outside the band.
The upshot is that FXR is kept inside the band via the intervention by the
foreign monetary authority at the boundaries, not inside the target zone. Without
such intervention there is no reason why FXR would stay inside the band. The
stochastic nature of FXR invariably would lead to it breaching the band without
such intervention. If, as in the USD/HKD case, the foreign currency (HKD) is
fully backed by the domestic currency (USD) reserves, to keep the foreign currency
inside the target zone, the foreign monetary authority (HKMA) must be bound by
clear rules that govern its reaction to FXR hitting the boundaries. There can be no
uncertainty about whether the foreign monetary authority will protect the band (or
how it will do it), or else FXR will breach it.
A.7 Pricing
For the sake of completeness, let us discuss some aspects of derivatives pricing in
the target zone. Some parts of this subsection closely follow [Carr and Kakushadze,
2015], which provides additional details.
Recall that rt = r(Xt), where r(x) is a deterministic function of x (and has no
explicit dependence on time t). Furthermore, let us focus on claims of the form
YT = Y (XT ) (see (6)). Let us define the pricing function
v(x, t, T ) = Bt E
(
B−1T YT
)
Q,Xt=x
(57)
Then Vt = v(Xt, t, T ). Since B−1t Vt is a Q-martingale, we have the following PDE
for v(x, t, T ):
∂tv(x, t, T ) + µ(x)∂xv(x, t, T ) +
σ2
2 ∂
2
xv(x, t, T )− r(x)v(x, t, T ) = 0 (58)
49 This result for h(x) can be obtained directly from (27) by requiring that h(x) and h′(x) are
continuous at x = ±L.
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subject to the terminal condition v(x, T, T ) = Y (x). Also, recall that r(Xt) =
dBt/dt. Further, note that the claim function Y (x) must satisfy the Neumann
boundary conditions ∂xY (x±) = 0. This follows from the fact that the pricing
function v(x, t, T ) must satisfy these boundary conditions: ∂xv(x, t, T ) = 0. This in
turn follows from the fact that, since the function f(x) describing the FXR process
St = f(Xt) is monotonically increasing, instead of viewing v(x, t, T ) as a function of
x, we can view it as a function of s = f(x). Thus, we have ∂xv = ∂svf ′(x), so ∂xv
indeed vanishes at the boundaries as f ′(x±) = 0.
Furthermore, we can rewrite (58) as a differential equations w.r.t. s (we have
used (12) in deriving this equation)
∂tv̂(s, t, T ) + ρ(s) [s∂sv̂(s, t, T )− v̂(s, t, T )] + σ
2
2 g(s)∂
2
s v̂(s, t, T ) = 0 (59)
Here v̂(s, t, T ) = v(x, t, T ), g(s) = [f ′(x)]2, and ρ(s) = r(x), where x is determined
from f(x) = s. A significant simplification arises for a “linear peg” (see (16)):
ρ(s) = r∗
[
1− s
S∗
]
(60)
Then we have the following solution:
v̂(s, t, T ) = a s
S∗
+ b
[
1− s
S∗
]
e−r∗(T−t) (61)
where a and b are constants. Thus, for a claim YT = ST , which corresponds to a
forward, we have b = 0 and a = S∗, so v̂(s, t, T ) = St, as it should be. On the other
hand, for a claim YT = 1, which corresponds to a zero-coupon T -bond (with the
principal given by 1 unit of the foreign currency paid at maturity T ), we have a = 1
and b = 1, so
v̂(s, t, T ) = s
S∗
+
[
1− s
S∗
]
e−r∗(T−t) (62)
Assuming, for simplicity, that the domestic rate rdt = rd is constant, we have the
following price for the T -bond (see (5)):
P (t, T ) = St
S∗
e−r
d(T−t) +
[
1− St
S∗
]
e−r̂(T−t) (63)
where r̂ = rd + r∗. Assuming that r∗ < rd/γ, straightforward algebra gives that the
r.h.s. in (63) is always less than 1, as it should be. Indeed, the foreign short rate
process is given by rft = rdt + r∗ [1− St/S∗], and it is always positive assuming that
rd > γr∗. Then the T -bond price, which is given by
P (t, T ) = E
(
exp
[
−
∫ T
t
dt′rft′
])
Q,Ft
(64)
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is always less than 1. On the other hand, as we discuss above, in high-volatility
environments r∗ dictated by the no-arbitrage condition (12) can be too large for
realistic values of rd, so rft would become negative and the T -bond price could
become greater than 1. On the flipside it would also mean that the maximum value
of rft = rd + γr∗ would be unrealistically high. So, in such real-life scenarios the
foreign monetary authority cannot peg the foreign interest rate to satisfy (12) and
(as we discuss in the main text of this paper) the band will be breached without
the foreign monetary authority’s intervention at the boundaries. I.e., without the
foreign monetary authority’s intervention, in high-volatility environments the foreign
interest rate rft would have to be unrealistically high when St approaches S− (strong
side), and it would have to become negative when St approaches S+ (weak side).
At first, there might appear to be a “simple” solution that would prevent rft
from turning negative. Thus, instead of rt = r∗ [1− St/S∗], we can attempt to
have a lopsided differential rate rt = r∗ [1− St/S+], so rt never turns negative, and,
consequently,50 neither does rft . However, this is trickier than it might appear. At
the boundaries we must have f ′(x±) = 0. Looking at (12), this then implies that we
have f ′′(x−) > 0, and f ′′(x+) = 0. This is not possible for a “linear peg”, i.e., the
function ρ(s) in (60) must be nonlinear in s (recall that rt = ρ(St)). An example
would be that S+−f(x) ∼ (x+−x)3 as x→ x+, in which case ρ(s) ∼ (S+− s)1/3 as
s→ S+. However, even if the weak-side issue (with the foreign interest rate turning
negative) is solved with a contrived “nonlinear peg”, in high-volatility environments
unrealistically high interest rates would still be required at the strong-side (i.e., as
St approaches S−), and the only way to ensure that the band is not breached is
through interventions by the foreign monetary authority.
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